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existing literature, counterfeiting, if it occurred, would be accompanied by two distortions: costly 
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refinement is shown to imply that there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting.  If the cost of producing 
counterfeits is low enough, then there is no monetary equilibrium.  Otherwise, there is a monetary 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The small analytical literature on counterfeiting, Green and Weber [2] and
Kulti [3], leaves the impression that counterfeiting is not necessarily harmful.
In particular, it is not consistent with the reasonable notion that counter-
feiting, like other forms of theft, produces two kinds of distortions. First,
a counterfeiter devotes productive eﬀort to an unproductive use–namely,
producing counterfeit money. Second, those who do not counterfeit take
costly actions to protect themselves from the eﬀects of receiving counterfeits.
In this paper, we set out a very simple matching-model of money in which
counterfeiting would be accompanied by both distortions if it occurred.
We borrow most of the components of the model from existing work. The
background environment is that in Shi [4] and Trejos and Wright [5], a setting
with divisible and costly-to-produce goods and money holdings restricted to
be in the set {0,1}. (In contrast, Green and Weber [2] and Kulti [3] as-
sume that both production and money holdings are in the set {0,1}.) The
informational features are taken from Williamson and Wright [7], in which
there is a recognizability problem regarding the quality of goods and none
regarding money. Here, we apply their formulation of the recognizability
problem to money–to the problem of distinguishing genuine from counter-
feit money.1 And we assume that people, at a cost, can decide to produce
counterfeit money. (This, too, diﬀers from Green and Weber [2] and Kulti
[3], who assume in most of their analyses that the stock of counterfeit money
is exogenous.) Finally, in order to provide a motivation for people to avoid
receiving counterfeit money, we assume that counterfeit money lasts just one
period; in particular, it immediately disintegrates after it is received in a
trade. This assumption builds into the model the fact that most reasonably
high-denomination currency ends up at banks after one use where counter-
feits tend to be detected. It also prevents counterfeits from alleviating a
shortage of money, an implausible role that appears in [2] and [3].
Our model has a surprising implication: There is no equilibrium in which
counterfeiting actually occurs. For a set of parameters for which counterfeit-
ing is suﬃciently unattractive–essentially, a high enough cost of producing
1Velde, Weber, and Wright [6] also apply the Williamson-Wright formulation of the
recognizability problem to money–to two commodity monies, monies which throw oﬀ
real dividends. Because their monies are commodity monies and because they assume
that the quantities of both monies are exogenous, their model is very diﬀerent from our
model.
2counterfeits and/or a high enough probability that counterfeits are recognized
prior to trade–there is a monetary equilibrium in which counterfeiting does
not occur. In the complement of that set, there is no monetary equilibrium
that satisﬁes the Cho-Kreps [1] reﬁnement–a reﬁnement that is natural in
our setting.
2T h e m o d e l
As noted above, the background environment is that in Shi [4] and Trejos
and Wright [5]. At each date there are N>2 types of perishable goods
and N specialization types of people. There is a [0,1] continuum of each
specialization type. A type-n person, n ∈ {1,2,...,N}, consumes only good
n and produces only good n + 1 (modulo N).
Each person maximizes expected discounted utility. Period utility for a
type-n person who does not produce counterfeit money is u(x) − y and is
u(x)−y −c for a type-n person who does produce counterfeit money, where
x is the amount of good n consumed and y is the amount of good n +1
produced and c>0. The function u is strictly increasing, twice diﬀerentiable,
and strictly concave, and u(0) = 0, u0(0) = ∞ and u0(∞)=0 .T h ed i s c o u n t
factor is β ∈ (0,1).
People cannot commit to future actions and trading histories are private
information. Those two assumptions and the absence of a double-coincidence
in any pairwise meeting implied by N>2 imply that trade must involve
money. We assume that money is indivisible and that each person’s holding
at any time is in the set {0,1}. There are two kinds of money: genuine
money and counterfeit money. The economy is endowed with a ﬁxed stock
of genuine money, the amount m ∈ (0,1) per specialization type.
The sequence of actions within a period is as follows. The period starts
with a fraction m of each specialization type holding genuine money. Those
without genuine money then decide whether or not to produce counterfeit
money. Let θ denote the fraction of the population who produce counterfeit
money so that people are split as follows: the fraction m have a unit of
genuine money, the fraction θ have a counterfeit, and the remainder, 1−m−θ
have neither money. People are then randomly paired oﬀ. The only meetings
that matter are trade meetings, single-coincidence meetings in which the
potential consumer, the buyer, has a unit of money, genuine or counterfeit,
and the potential producer, the seller, does not. Following Williamson and
3Wright [7], in any trade meeting, the pair receives a signal regarding the
“quality” of the money of the buyer: with probability φ the signal reveals
the type of money held by the buyer–either genuine or counterfeit–and
with probability 1−φ the signal is uninformative leaving the seller with the
posterior probability m/(m+θ) that the money is genuine. After the signal
is realized, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it lottery oﬀer to the seller.
After meetings dissolve, any counterfeit money disintegrates.
We study only allocations that are symmetric across specialization types.
For such allocations, our economy has no potentially varying “state:” each
date starts with a fraction m of individuals of each specialization type holding
genuine money. Therefore, we also restrict our analysis to constant alloca-
tions.
3 Equilibrium allocations
No matter how pairwise trade is modeled, our setting does not permit the
existence of a separating equilibrium–one in which θ>0 and in which hold-
ers of genuine money distinguish themselves in trade meetings from holders
of counterfeit money when the uninformative signal is realized. Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that there is such an equilibrium. Then sellers would
never produce in exchange for a counterfeit. But separation implies that sell-
ers do produce for genuine money. But, then, a holder of counterfeit money
gains by duplicating the strategy of the holder of genuine money and we have
a contradiction. Therefore, we study only pooling allocations in which hold-
ers of counterfeit money exactly emulate the actions of holders of genuine
money when the uninformative signal is realized.
A constant and symmetric allocation consists of three quantities: output
in trade meetings when the informative signal is realized, qI, output in trade
meetings when the uninformative signal is realized, qU, and the fraction of
people who produce counterfeits, θ. Let v0 denote the discounted utility of
beginning a date without money, let v1 denote that of beginning with genuine
money, and let ∆ ≡ β(v1 − v0). Without loss of generality, we describe the
buyer take-it-or-leave-it problems for holders of genuine money under the
assumption that ∆ ≥ 0 and under the assumption that there is no lottery
over output, just over whether the buyer surrenders money.
4Problem 1 Choose (qj,p j) ∈ R+ ×[0,1] to maximize u(qj)−pj∆ subject to
−qj + pjλj∆ ≥ 0, (1)
for j = I,U with λI =1and λU = m
m+θ.
The objective in this problem is the buyer’s gain from trade, u(qj)+
pjβv0 +( 1− pj)βv1 − βv1. Maximizing it is equivalent to maximizing the
buyer’s pay-oﬀ because βv1 is a constant. Also, because (qj,p j)=( 0 ,0) is
feasible in this problem and implies a zero value for the objective, any solution
to this problem implies a non negative gain from trade for the buyer. The
constraint, (1), is a non negative gain from trade for the seller taking into
account that when the uninformative signal is realized, j = U, the seller’s
posterior distribution is that the buyer’s money is genuine with probability
m
m+θ.
Next, we express v0 and v1 in terms of the trades and the choice of whether
to counterfeit. We have,
(1 − β)v0 =m a x {C, ˜ C}, (2)
where
C = −c +
1 − m − θ
N





[φ(−qI + pI∆)+( 1− φ)(−qU + pU∆)] −
θ
N
(1 − φ)qU. (4)
And we have
(1 − β)v1 =
1 − m − θ
N
{φ[u(qI) − pI∆)] + (1 − φ)[u(qU) − pU∆]}. (5)
In (3), C is the ﬂow pay-oﬀ to counterfeiting and in (4), ˜ C is the ﬂow pay-oﬀ
to not counterfeiting. We can now deﬁne an equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation (qI,q U,θ) is a monetary equilibrium if max{qI,q U}
> 0 and if there exists (pI,p U) and (v0,v 1) such that (i) (qI,p I) and (qU,p U)
solve problem 1; (ii) (2)-(5) hold; (iii) max{C, ˜ C} = ˜ C and θ>0 implies
max{C, ˜ C} = C; (iv) the Cho-Kreps reﬁnement is satisﬁed.
5The ﬁrst condition in (iii) is necessary in order that not everyone coun-
terfeit. If they do, then there are no sellers. As regards condition (iv), the
Cho-Kreps reﬁnement for a pooling equilibrium of this model requires that
a holder of genuine money not have a proﬁtable deviation that would signal
that the money is genuine–a proﬁtable deviation that a holder of counterfeit
money would not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to emulate.
We begin by describing the solution to problem 1.
Lemma 1 Let ˆ qj = λj∆ and let q∗
j b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt ou0(q∗
j)= 1
λj.
The solution to problem 1 is qj =m i n {ˆ qj,q∗
j} and (1) at equality.
Proof. Any solution to problem 1 satisﬁes (1) at equality. It follows that
if the constraint pj ≤ 1 is not binding, then the solution is qj = q∗
j. If it is
binding, then ˆ qj <q ∗
j and the solution is qj =ˆ qj and pj =1 .
Now we delineate the set of parameters alluded to in the introduction.







(This expression for ˆ q comes from setting qI = qU =ˆ q,( pI,p U)=( 1 ,1), and
(v0,v 1)=( 0 , ˆ q/β)i n( 5 ) . )A l s o ,l e tq∗ be the unique solution to u0(q∗)=1a n d
let ¯ q =m i n {ˆ q,q∗}. Now let
A = {(c,φ):c ≥
1 − m
N
(1 − φ)u(¯ q)}. (7)
This is a simple set because ¯ q does not depend on c or φ.
Proposition 1 If (c,φ) ∈ A, then θ =0and qI = qU =¯ q is a monetary
equilibrium.
Proof. We propose pI = pU = p. If min{ˆ q,q∗} =ˆ q,t h e nw ep r o p o s e
p =1a n d( v0,v 1)=( 0 , ˆ q/β). If min{ˆ q,q∗} = q∗,t h e nw ep r o p o s ev0 =0 ,( 1 −
β)v1 = 1−m
N [u(q∗)−q∗], and p given by (1) at equality. By construction, these
proposals satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of deﬁnition 1. As regards condition
(iii), the proposal implies ˜ C =0a n dt h ed e ﬁnition of A implies that C ≤ 0.
Condition (iv) does not arise.
6Proposition 2 If (c,φ) / ∈ A, then there is no monetary equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is such an equilib-
rium. Either θ =0o rθ ∈ (0,1). The former is impossible because, as is
easily veriﬁed, any such equilibrium must be the proposal in proposition 1.
And with (c,φ) / ∈ A, that proposal implies ˜ C =0a n dC>0, a contradiction.
Therefore, the equilibrium must have counterfeiting, which, in turn, implies
qU > 0a n dpU > 0.
N o ww ea p p l yt h eC h o - K r e p sr e ﬁnement. Consider a deviation by a
holder of genuine money that satisﬁes q<q U.A n ys u c ho ﬀer is viewed by
the seller as coming from a holder of genuine money because a counterfeiter
cares only about the amount of output obtained. It is easy to see that there
exist such deviations that are proﬁtable for a holder of genuine money and
that are accepted by the seller. Proﬁtability for a holder of genuine money
is
u(q)+( 1− p)∆ >u (qU)+( 1− pU)∆, (8)
while acceptance by the seller is −q+p∆ ≥ 0. Because (qU,p U)i sp a r to fa n
equilibrium, it must satisfy −qU + pU
m
m+θ∆ ≥ 0. Therefore, acceptance by
the seller is implied by




Let q0 satisfy u(q0)+( 1−pU
m
m+θ)∆ = u(qU)+( 1−pU)∆.I fq ∈ (q0,q U)a n d
p = pU
m
m+θ, then (8) and (9) hold. Hence, an equilibrium with qU > 0d o e s
not satisfy the Cho-Kreps reﬁnement.
Therefore, as we said at the outset, there is no equilibrium with coun-
terfeiting. If (c,φ) ∈ A, which should be interpreted as counterfeiting being
suﬃciently unattractive, then there is a monetary equilibrium in which coun-
terfeiting does not occur. If (c,φ) / ∈ A, then there is no monetary equilibrium.
4 Concluding remarks
We began by constructing a simple model that we thought would give rise
to a region of the parameter space in which counterfeiting occurs. That
turned out not to be the case. Our model has many extreme assumptions:
the simple nature of the signal; the perishable nature of counterfeit money;
7money holdings in the set {0,1}; the assumption that people are identical (for
example, everyone has the same cost of counterfeiting), and the assumption
that buyers make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. However, it is far from obvious
that departures from these assumptions would overturn the non existence we
ﬁnd.
We have given some thought to replacing the last assumption by having
buyers make oﬀers with some probability and having sellers make oﬀers with
the complementary probability. However, so long as buyers sometimes make
such oﬀers, there is no equilibrium with counterfeiting. The argument in the
proof of proposition 2 says that output cannot be positive when the buyer
makes the oﬀer and the uninformative signal is realized. And lemma 1 says
that output is not zero if genuine money is valuable, ∆ > 0. Finally, as is
well-known, there is no monetary equilibrium in this model if sellers always
make the oﬀer.
The non existence of an equilibrium with counterfeiting seems to arise
because holders of counterfeit money value output as least as much as do
holders of genuine money and value retaining money less than do holders
of genuine money.2 Those features seem reasonable. If we take seriously
the non existence of an equilibrium with counterfeiting, then the message is
that counterfeiting can be a serious threat even if we do not see it occurring.
That is, actions taken to keep the cost of producing counterfeits high and
the probability that counterfeits can be recognized high can be worthwhile
even if (a signiﬁcant amount of) counterfeiting is not observed.
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